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DON'T FORGET THE LAWYERS: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS IN PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
IN EMERGING MARKET DEMOCRACIES
Gillian K. Hadfield*

INTRODUCTION

Americans have a paradoxical relationship with the law. At home,
we vilify lawyers and the legal system-particularly the tort systemas a landscape of waste, strategizing, and dissembling. Yet on the
world stage, we trumpet the rule of law and the genius of the American system, and we vigorously promote their adoption in emerging
market democracies. From constitutional law to corporate and commercial law, American models have been advocated by the army of
American economic and legal experts that have provided assistance to
emerging market democracies in developing and postcommunist
countries.' The critiques and kudos come from academics as well as
practitioners and policymakers. 2 Professors Robert Kagan and John
Langbein, for example, decry the cost of the American adversarial
system, but an emerging literature attributes higher economic produc-

* Kirtland Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, University of Southern California
Gould School of Law. Thanks to participants at the Twelfth Annual Clifford Symposium for
helpful comments and especially Stephan Landsman, Marc Galanter, and Stephen Burbank.
1. See Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L 179 (1999). In fact, U.S. constitutional models appear to have been adopted widely, but corporate laws in many transition countries have followed European, U.K., and U.S. models.
Katharina Pistor, Patternsof Legal Change: Shareholderand Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 59 (2000) (noting, however, the influence of USAID efforts
and the prevalence of U.S. legal advice, as well as pressures to harmonize with EU laws for
accession to the EU); cf Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A CrossCountry Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791 (2002) (discussing the evolution of corporate law in origin countries and the evolution of law after it is transplanted to other countries).
2. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); John
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
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tivity in common-law countries to their legal systems, 3 and emphasizes
4
the value of institutions such as juries and highly independent judges.
It is tempting to attribute the appearance of a paradox to lawyers
themselves: it is American lawyering that leads to abuses of the U.S.
system and undermines the rule of law-a rule of law that remains a
model for the rest of the world. When Jeffrey Sachs, a leading economic adviser to many governments in transition, said, "Russia
doesn't need economists. It needs lawyers," a New York lawyer and
legal adviser to several Eastern European governments responded
that "[tihe mere presence of an army of lawyers representing different
and normally opposing interests and clients could not have been what
Professor Sachs contemplated."' 5 Only "at their idealistic best . . .
act[ing] as exacting public spirited legislative craftsmen" can lawyers
implant the rule of law in fledgling market democracies. 6 Certainly,
blaming lawyers for the problem with law is widespread in the public
debate, even among lawyers and judges. Professor Judith Resnik has
noted the role that federal judges have played in criticizing the Ameri7
can legal system and advocating alternatives to its use.
I believe that taking lawyers out of the rule of law equation, however, is a major error. This is not just because lawyers are experts in
drafting legislation 8 and in solving problems in the interest group
politics that produce legislation, as Professors Peter Grajzl and Peter
Murrell have recently argued. 9 In my view, the largely exclusive focus
of much of the legal reform effort on the content of static legal ruleslegislative or otherwise-is misplaced. While rules are important for
transitional purposes, the dynamic properties of a legal system-its
capacity to adapt to local and changing conditions-are more impor3. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595
(2003); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002); Rafael
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinantsof External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law
and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
4. Much of this literature is, however, focused on legal origins and historical explanation, and
does not specifically address the details of modern institutions and their relationship to supporting markets and economic growth.
5. Jenik Radon, Permitted Unless Prohibited: The Changed Soviet Mentality, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 365, 365-66 (1996) (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Our Eastern European Challenge:
Providing Technical Assistance to Struggling Democracies, 78 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 8, 8).
6. Id. at 366.
7. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
II1, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000).
8. Radon, supra note 5, at 366.
9. Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal
Professions on Institutional Reforms (Dec. 11, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
489743.
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tant to the vitality of a market democracy in the long run.10 As many
have observed, but analysts sometimes forget, it is not the, law on the
books but the law in action that matters."' Moreover, even those who
focus on legal reform through legislation recognize that merely importing statutory provisions from one country to another, particularly
from a mature market economy to one still in its infancy, is ill-fated
12
because it fails to take local circumstances into account.
This Article claims that lawyers are essential to the dynamic capacity of a legal system and the rule of law because they are the carriers
of "legal human capital"-the raw material on which a legal system
draws in the process of interpreting, implementing, and adapting legality to local and changing conditions. In this context, I use legal
human capital to mean the shared knowledge accumulated within the
legal profession-judges, lawyers, legislators, and law professorsabout the real-world impact of legal regulation.' 3 In recent work, I
present a model of the evolution of law that emphasizes the role of
legal human capital in determining the likelihood of legal errormeaning mistakes that reduce social welfare-in the application of
general rules to particular circumstances. 14 I examine how the accumulation of legal human capital depends on creating incentives for
litigants to invest resources in developing legal arguments that connect their particular experiences to the legal system. These investments accumulate as shared legal human capital in a legal system.
Expertise developed by a lawyer while prosecuting or defending an
antitrust case or a tort action is initially shared with the lawyer's colleagues; in time, it is shared with the legal profession as a whole
through the publication of legal decisions, scholarly writing, conferences, and symposia. Ultimately, this shared knowledge enables future lawyers and courts (as well as legislators and legal commentators)
to apply antitrust or tort law with greater subtlety. This process is
reflected in the well-documented increase in the growth of law firms
10. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Quality of Law in Civil Code and Common Law Regimes: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law (2006), available at http://works.
bepress.com/ghadfietd/6/ [hereinafter Hadfield, Quality of Law]. For an analysis emphasizing
the importance of the dynamic attributes of corporate law, see Pistor et al., supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant
Effect, 51 AM. J. CoMP. L 163 (2003).
12. See, e.g., deLisle, supra note 1, at 179-80, 256-74.
13. There are other types of legal human capital, such as the capacity to apply formal legal
reasoning or attain coherence among a set of legal principles. I emphasize knowledge about the
economic and social impact of law because this is an important factor in the dynamic adaptation
of law to different environments and the capacity of law to effectively promote particular realworld effects.
14. Hadfield, Quality of Law, supra note 10.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:401

and the increasing specialization in the American legal profession. 15
Increasing returns to human capital predict these effects. 1 6
Specialization and increasing legal human capital are not necessarily good for the rule of law. Indeed, there is the potential for legal
human capital to be "disinformative" and decrease the capacity of a
legal system to accurately interpret, implement, and adapt legal rules
over time. Disinformative legal human capital is created when litigants mislead courts about the facts or the law to obtain favorable
results. The extent of this phenomenon is, I believe, an open and understudied question. Moreover, increasing legal human capital implies increasing legal costs, which undermines the delivery of legality
in fact. The problem is not, however, with lawyers themselves, but
rather with the structure and regulation of the market for lawyers,
including the unconstrained tendency of legal reasoning to generate
increasingly complex rules-a topic I explored in earlier work. 17
This Article examines the relationship of lawyers to the rule of law
in practice, both in the effort to establish the rule of law in emerging
market democracies and in the effort to maintain the rule of law in
established market democracies such as our own. I focus on the "market" part of "market democracies," although I believe the ideas extend to the "democracy" part as well. Part II examines the ways in
which lawyers function to promote the rule of law, and the failure in
many legal reform projects to recognize the importance of lawyers to
this process. Part III explores the relationships between what lawyers
do and the accumulation of legal human capital, and between legal
human capital and the evolution of effective legal regimes. Part IV
discusses the potential disadvantages of lawyers' efforts and the ways
in which existing legal markets in advanced market economies tend to
undermine the rule of law.

II.

LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW

Those who seek to replace centrally planned, authoritarian regimes
with decentralized market economies commonly think of the rule of
law as something ordered by the state through rules of conduct enforced by public prosecutors. The model is one of criminal law: law is
the public designation of zones of prohibited and permitted behavior.
15. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCrURE OF THE BAR
(2005).
16. For a general discussion of the increasing returns to human capital, see Sherwin Rosen,
Specialization and Human Capital, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 43 (1983).
17. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000) [hereinafter Hadfield, Price of Law].
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Yet the essence of market economies is decentralization, in which relationships are loosely structured around private creative efforts to
learn, adapt, and respond to a changing environment. The same is
true of the legal system and the role of lawyers in a market economy.
Lawyers are nodes in the networks of this decentralized world, connecting individuals to firms, firms to each other, and all to the public
and private bodies that recognize, coordinate, and regulate these
relationships.
The rule of law means very little apart from the practical world in
which law is communicated and implemented in millions of groundlevel decisions and interactions. This is true of both public law, such
as economic regulation, and private law, such as contract and corporate law. If the law is ignored in the behavioral decisions made by
individuals and firms, it has no effect. Investment in public resources
for enforcement can address this problem in the public law sphere by
forcing compliance through fines and penalties. But in the private
sphere, a change in the law of contracts, for example, is a dead letter if
contracting parties are not aware of the law or do not rely on it in
fashioning their transactions or enforcing obligations. Even in the
public law sphere, as a practical matter, it seems impossible to expect
public regulation to be effective without substantial private assessment of the bounds of legality and voluntary compliance. Thus, the
rule of law cannot be assessed or created without focusing on the
work of lawyers in a given environment. The rule of law cannot be
established by putting laws on the books, by devoting resources to
public enforcement, or even by eliminating corruption-though these
are all important steps. To be effective, the rule of law must also be
integrated into the complex, decentralized choices made by millions of
individuals and entities. And it is here that the contribution provided
by lawyers plays a role.
In the most basic sense, lawyers act as repositories of the complex
of legal rules and principles relevant to structuring relationships and
resolving disputes within them. They communicate these rules to their
clients, advising them about what the legal consequences of a particular organizational form, contract provision, or business strategy might
be. They predict for them the success that customers, suppliers, and
governments might have in challenging their conduct or resisting challenges. This is not merely an information transmission function; it can
be a deeply creative one. Few legal rules, particularly in transitional
or dynamic market environments, are clear-cut. Statutory provisions
and case law must be interpreted and their implications evaluated in
light of both a particular client's circumstances and the accumulated
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experience of the legal profession and the judiciary as a whole. Alternative strategies-for contract or organizational design, financing, intervention in administrative regulation, dispute resolution, and so
on-have to be generated, evaluated, communicated to clients, and
implemented, all within the framework of legal rules and the likelihood of how they will be invoked or implemented in practice.
But these legal functions-which are, in fact, economic servicesdepend on far more than knowledge of the rules. They require knowledge of complex environments and relationships, such as the risks facing a joint venture or the organizational structure of an employer
seeking to reduce the risk of sexual harassment or tort liability. They
also require knowledge of the ways other lawyers and judges will interpret these relationships and the package of legal materials that
might be relevant to the resolution of the dispute. As every experienced law professor knows, the challenge of legal education often involves getting students to realize that it's not just about knowing the
rules, it's about becoming a member of the legal culture and developing judgment within that culture: assessing what arguments and strategies are possible, which arguments and strategies are strong, and how
those assessments depend on the subtleties and vagaries of facts and
the possibilities of proof. Students are often surprised to discover that
people can see a set of facts or read a contract term or a legislative
provision very differently. Navigating that world is the work of the
lawyer, and much of it is accumulated only through experience,
mentoring, and dialogue with other lawyers. What is learned about
law is constructed through the shared practice of law.
As a consequence, the rule of law depends on more than a wellschooled legal profession. Generating a rule of law in an environment
in which there has not been one, or in which the rule of law has focused more heavily on state regulation and planning than on facilitating decentralized relationships, requires more than the didactic
education of a collection of people as lawyers. It depends on the
ongoing structure of legal work and markets for legal services. If what
lawyers learn depends on what lawyers do, the demand for and supply
of their services is a factor in the pattern of what is accumulated as
legal knowledge. If what lawyers share with other lawyers depends on
the organization of legal services, then the regulation of legal organizations by a legislature or by the bar is a factor in the accumulation of
legal knowledge.
In Slovakia, following the fall of Communism, for example, there
were rules-written by the bar and enacted by the legislature-establishing minimum prices for legal services, prohibiting pro bono ser-
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vices except in extraordinary circumstances, and forbidding the
employment of one lawyer by another, which effectively limited the
size of law firms and the capacity of junior lawyers to work with senior
lawyers.' 8 Organizational rules such as these have an impact on the
rule of law through their effect on the price and distribution of legal
services and the capacity of the legal profession to transmit accumulated experience and to develop specialized expertise. If lawyers cannot employ other lawyers, law firms can grow only through the
addition of more partners, rather than through the addition of associates who perform legal work not directly for a client but for a partner.
The latter organization allows a partner with an established reputation
and a network of clients to expand the scale of that partner's work. 19
This can reduce the cost of legal services to clients by increasing the
information available about potential legal representation-choosing
among a smaller set of established partners with track records poses
lower search costs than choosing among a wider set of lawyers with
varying levels of experience. It also allows the experienced partner to
share that experience with, and offer the opportunity for generating
experience to, entering lawyers. Larger law firms also support increased specialization, reaping the benefits of increasing returns to investments in human capital. For law firms serving the emerging
business entities in a new market democracy, for example, this can
mean critical investments in the high cost of understanding and working with new laws on incorporation, property transactions, bankruptcy, contract enforcement, state regulation, and so on.
Consider one of the classic rule of law problems in transitional and
developing market economies: the enforcement of contractual bargains. This was likely at the forefront of the experience that led Sachs
to say that Russia does not need more economists, it needs more lawyers. Collecting on promised payments is a fundamental problem for
most businesses in new market economies. In an important sense, of
course, the problem is about money-or the lack thereof. But it is
also a problem of law, as emphasized in research done by Professors
Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff on con18. I visited Slovakia during 2003 and 2004 on a project for the World Bank to assess the
nature of the organization and the regulation of the legal profession. My observations in this
Part are based on my review of Slovak law and interviews with lawyers, judges, and officials in
the Ministry of Justice.
19. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 567 (1989).
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tracting in transitional economies in Central Europe and Vietnam. 20
Their work identified a significant relationship between the willingness of businesses to extend trade credit and the perceived enforceability of contracts. Like other work on the role of the legal system in
supporting contractual commitments, however, this research does not
21
identify the particular legal attributes that undermine enforcement.
The problem with the law might be a lack of judicial reliability and, in
particular, the problem of judicial corruption that is thought to plague
new market economies. From a pure "law" perspective, it seems a
very simple matter of what the law should be: if you promised payment for the goods or services received, you have to pay. And yet the
capacity of a system to generate performance of these contracts-to
implement the rule of law in contractual relationships-is also deeply
related to the structure of the markets for legal services and the conduct of lawyers. Even with honest judges, it takes access to lawyerslawyers with skill and ingenuity-to reduce the risks of contracting
and hence extend the reach of market relationships.
Legal expertise and experience can allow lawyers to craft more
complex contractual relationships, ones that sequence performance
and payment to reduce risk, for example. They also allow lawyers to
design payment vehicles, such as escrow accounts or securitization,
with lower joint costs than the reliance on complete collateralization
that is often seen in new market economies. Legal creativity can result in innovations such as the design of private contract enforcement
mechanisms, as we have seen in trade associations, 22 internet, 23 or
20. Simon Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Courts and Relational Contracts,
18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 221 (2002); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention
Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 637 (1999); John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1285 (1999);
John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000).
21. See Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 20, app. c at 273 (asking respondents to
identify "which of the following third parties can enforce an agreement with a customer or supplier" and listing as possible responses: court, national government, local government, nongovernmental organizations, other, and "no one"). There are two problems with this question.
First, it could be interpreted as asking about the theoretical capacity of these institutions to
enforce contracts. Second, it does not identify the nature of the problem with enforcement by
courts. For a discussion on the multiple ways in which contract enforcement might fail in a legal
regime, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175 (Claude Menard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2005).
22. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724 (2001).
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transborder 24 transactions in established market economies. Knowledge of the complex interrelationship between legal rules, legal arguments, and evidentiary resources can be employed to more accurately
predict which obligations can be enforced and at what cost, in light of
the possibility that even honest judges will misunderstand the transaction and how the rules apply to it. Legal expertise can even assist in
the reduction of corruption; lawyers can evaluate the likelihood that a
judicial decision can be explained as a good-faith application of the
appropriate legal principles to the established facts. At a minimum,
the lawyers exchanging information about judges can reduce the cost
of navigating the legal system and direct more cases to reliable judges,
sorting the good from the bad and perhaps even modifying judges'
incentives.
The capacity of lawyers to influence the ultimate enforcement of
contractual bargains is a function of accumulated legal human capital
in a system. The determinants of legal human capital are numerous
and subtle. Legal human capital is costly to acquire and so those who
might use legal services need incentives to expend resources on its
production. Specialization has to be valuable, legal creativity has to
be valuable, and the prediction of legal outcomes has to be valuable.
As I will explore in more detail in Part III, there is an important equilibrium relationship between the value of legal human capital to litigants and transacting parties, and the level of legal human capital
deployed by the courts that resolve disputes and interpret transactions. Promoting the rule of law through lawyers requires that we understand the relationship between lawyers, litigants, courts, and legal
human capital.
The work of lawyers is important to the rule of law for reasons that
go beyond the value of their services in a given transaction or adjudication. The first mistake of many legal reform efforts is to focus only
on the content of rules and not on the implementation of those rules;
the second is to assume that the achievement of the rule of law is a
static problem of identifying the particular rules that a market economy should implement. Far more important, I believe, is the dynamic
capacity of a market economy to interpret, apply, and adapt rules in
light of local and changing conditions. The rule of law is not effective
in a decentralized system if courts apply rules in such an erroneous or
inappropriate manner that individuals and firms either avoid the law
23. Gillian K. Hadfield, Delivering Legality on the Internet: Developing Principlesfor the Private Provision of Commercial Law, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 154 (2004).
24. D. McBarnet, Transnational Transactions: Legal Work, Cross-Border Commerce and
Global Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 98 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
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or find it useless to plan their relationships or resolve their private
disputes in light of the rules. A private law rule that is transplanted
from a very different environment or that does not keep up with the
pace of change in an economy may be as ineffective as one that is
never communicated to those whose behavior it seeks to organize.
Widespread disregard of public laws also undermines the rule of law
in a society: the resources available for enforcement are scarce and
the creation of a rule of law requires substantial voluntary compliance.
Moreover, widespread disregard of the law may alter the capacity for
enforcement by throwing culpability for a violation into question.
Thus, the extent to which a rule is reasonably well adapted to local or
changing conditions is important for the establishment of the rule of
law in the long run.
Lawyers play a critical part in this dynamic aspect of the rule of law.
Indeed, the vitality of the legal profession may be more important for
the long-term achievement of the rule of law than it is for the static
implementation of a given set of rules for a particular set of clients.
The legal profession as a whole-including not only lawyers in private
practice but also judges, hearing officers, legal scholars, and those employed by the executive and legislative branches-defines the industry
in which the costly creative and analytical work of interpreting, applying, adapting, and designing legal rules takes place. It is the factory in
which the rule of law is built. The value of the product created is
short-lived if it does not continue to adapt to changing costs, demand,
and competition.
Much of the value of the product of law in a dynamic sense depends
on the accumulation and distribution of legal human capital. Legal
human capital consists of what the profession and its various constituent parts know about law and the environment in which law is being
implemented. Developing an effective antitrust law, for example, depends on the extent to which lawyers, judges, and legal scholars develop expertise about the competitive environments in specific
industries, the likely responses of firms to bright-line rules as opposed
to standards, and the impact of injunctive remedies on consumers.
When a government sues Microsoft, for example, alleging an illegal
tying arrangement between the operating system and a browser or
media player, the legal profession requires expertise in order to resolve cases in a way that generates effective rules for competition.
Lawyers must know about network externalities, technology, the
likely impact of compulsory licensing, and the effect of eroding patent
rights on the incentive to innovate in this specific industry. If the expertise is not generated within the profession-if there are no lawyers
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who have accumulated experience with cases like this, if judges are
either not adept at understanding the issues at stake or poorly educated by litigants who lack the incentive to present expertise to the
court, if legal commentators have little information about what evidence has been presented in past cases and what arguments and reasons have been used by courts-then the rules that emerge are either
so unpredictable as to lose their identity as rules or so wrongheaded
from a practical perspective that they will be routinely ignored. In
either case, a legal system that does not generate a reasonable level of
expertise in the interpretation, application, and adaptation of rules
over time does not generate an effective rule of law.
The dynamic ability of a legal regime to generate legal human capital to improve the quality of law is, therefore, an important consideration in our discussions about the rule of law. Moreover, as I will
explore in more detail in Part IV, it is possible that the returns to legal
human capital are, at some point, negative. While some level of expertise is important to ensure that legal rules are applied and interpreted with nuance and refinement, too much expertise may generate
excessive costs and even introduce excessive uncertainty. There too
the rule of law may disappear, lost in hundred-page opinions, enormous evidentiary records, expert testimony that requires an advanced
degree to interpret, and litigation that takes millions of dollars and
several years of appeals to resolve. Before reaching this discussion,
however, I turn to the basic analysis of the incentives for lawyers that
are broadly understood to generate legal human capital.
III.

THE ACCUMULATION OF LEGAL HUMAN CAPITAL, LEGAL
ERROR, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LAW

I want to consider here the way in which legal human capital accumulates within the legal system. It is shared legal human capital
that has an impact on the dynamic quality of law and on the capacity
of a legal regime to engender and maintain the rule of law. Implicit in
the concept of accumulated legal human capital is the idea that much
of what is learned in a legal system is accumulated through learningby-doing. Practical experience comes from observing the impact of
particular rules in particular settings, discussing strategies and constraints with clients, being educated about an industry on behalf of a
litigant seeking to enforce or avoid legal liability, and consulting experts who are paid to analyze data, interview people, or construct
models. It is not the kind of learning that comes from abstract analysis; it is inductive, not deductive, although deduction will play a role in
weaving what is learned into the web of legal concepts.
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The importance of this kind of learning is evidenced by the tremendous returns in experience and specialization that we see in the legal
profession. The work of the transactional lawyer, for example, is infused with reference to other similar transactions that this particular
lawyer, or the lawyer's firm, has put together in the past. Indeed, law
firms collect these models and organize them as contracting precedents, available in a database to which their members contribute and
draw. In adjudication, the experienced lawyer is highly prized; a lawyer with experience with this particular cause of action, in this industry, in this jurisdiction, before this judge, is prized even more. In the
25
common-law system, which is the major focus of my discussion here,
the structure of legality itself is based on the idea that it is only by
looking at what is learned in fact-specific opinions from earlier cases
that a judge or lawyer can come to know what the rules are. The
constitutional requirement of a case or controversy as the basis of a
court's jurisdiction speaks to the fundamental importance of what can
be known only by learning from real events and disputes. The same is
true of rules of appellate review, which defer to the capacity of the
trial judge who is immersed in the full factual record as it develops
and thus really "knows" the case. The common requirement that
judges have experience as practitioners prior to ascending to the
bench is rooted in the belief that the capacity to judge the law can be
acquired only by doing the law.
Thus our conception of law is a fundamentally organic one. We
have to look at the process by which legal human capital grows in a
distributed way, based on what lawyers do and therefore what they
can learn, and how what they learn is disseminated to others. This is a
largely unstudied topic, one that provides a rich agenda for research
among those interested in the productivity of a legal system and its
capacity to generate both high-quality and effective legal rules. I will
confine myself here to discussing the results from my other work in an
effort to model this process. 26 This simplified analysis allows us to
look at particular pieces of this puzzle and should not be misunderstood to be a complete account of learning-by-doing within the legal
profession.
Imagine a simple world in which there is a legal rule that requires
attention to only a few criteria. For example, suppose there is a per se
antitrust rule against vertical restraints by which a manufacturer imposes controls over the territory in which a retailer may resell its prod25. 1 have previously explored the question of how legal human capital accumulates in civil
code jurisdictions. Hadfield, Quality of Law, supra note 10.
26. See id.
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ucts. Lawyers arguing a case under this rule for either the plaintiff or
the defendant develop the evidence relevant to the rule-whether the
manufacturer has in fact imposed control over the territory. They develop expertise in identifying the ways in which such control might be
exercised (overt contractual provisions, implied obligations, practices
of terminating retailers who do not follow "suggested" territorial divisions) and in arguing about whether the rule, properly interpreted,
covers a particular set of facts. In this setting, legal human capital
refers to the product of the investment of time and resources that
these lawyers, and the judges who decide the case, invest in learning
about the facts of a particular case and developing and evaluating creative legal arguments. Those case-specific investments in legal human
capital then contribute to the accumulation of shared legal human
capital within the profession through a number of avenues: mentoring, peer discussions, documents retained within law firms, conferences, bar meetings and informal networking among attorneys and
judges, legal journals, casebooks, treatises, publicly available opinions,
legal briefs, and case files. The greater the investments made by individual lawyers, judges, and legal experts in a case, the greater the potential accumulation of shared legal human capital within the
profession.
Note that as experience with the rule accumulates, at least initially,
the likelihood of legal error and unpredictability in the application of
the rule decreases. 27 It may be difficult, at first, to determine whether
anything other than an overt contractual provision establishing the
territory in which a retailer may sell the manufacturer's goods falls
within the ambit of the rule. Experience with less overt forms of control, and the impact of such controls on the capacity of retailers to
compete within the same territory, gradually fills in and leads to more
predictability over a wider range of cases. Judges with access to the
analysis generated in other fact-specific cases become more adept at
seeing the flaws and virtues in different legal arguments and different
factual settings. This rule becomes more effective as those subject to
it are able to plan their relationships and design their contracts in reliance on the rule and choose to comply with the rule voluntarily given
better predictions about the likely outcome of litigation challenging it.
Accumulated experience assists the transactional lawyer, who must
advise a retailer whether it can resist a territorial restriction demanded by a manufacturer (with the credible assertion that the provi-

27. See infra Part IV (considering the possibility that initially, error may increase).
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sion would not be enforceable) or to assess the risks associated with
breaching such a provision.
The accumulation and sharing of legal human capital assists in the
improvement of the rule of law in a static sense-getting the rule right
over time. This is important for the rule of law, but it does not yet
capture the dynamic quality of the rule of law that I emphasized in
Part II. To see that dynamic quality, imagine that into this simple
28
world we introduce a new type of product-such as a television that requires considerable investment by a retailer in showroom space
and knowledgeable salespeople. Perhaps in the original environment
there is high-quality information about or experience with the product
readily available to consumers, whereas consumers in the new environment are unfamiliar with the product or have restricted access to
information as a result of communication barriers or other constraints.
Manufacturers of the product in this new world are frustrated by the
rule against territorial restrictions; they have difficulty convincing retailers to invest in adequate showroom facilities and employees, because they lose sales to customers who browse and research in their
store, but then cross the street or go online to buy from a seller with
low overhead who can undercut them on price.
The rule of law will likely be undermined in such a setting. Manufacturers will look to avoid compliance with the law. They may find
legal ways to do this, such as vertically integrating into retailing and
thus internalizing the free-rider problem that plagues the independent
retailer, even if this is inefficient. They may devise arrangements that
substantially increase the cost of discovering and proving the violation, such as complicated incentive schemes that have the same effect
as territorial restrictions and reduce the capacity of public officials to
enforce the law.
If territorial restrictions become widespread, public officials may
simply stop enforcing the law. Contracts between manufacturers and
28. Although it seems anachronistic in 2007 to appeal to a television as a novel product, the
reference here is to Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), in which the
Supreme Court rejected the per se rule against vertical territorial restrictions in favor of a rule of
reason that would allow consideration of economic benefits from such a restriction. The decision
was explicitly informed by legal human capital about how markets for products "unknown to the
consumer" might most efficiently be marketed:
Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use such
restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers. For example,
new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in
order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the
consumer.
Id. at 54-55 (citation omitted).
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retailers may, if the problem is sufficiently severe, be withdrawn from
public enforcement into private enforcement through arbitration by
industry insiders who understand that territorial restrictions are essential. Manufacturers may seek waivers of the antitrust defense from
retailers, allowing them to enforce the territorial restrictions. Thus,
the law in action will diverge from the law on the books. This is the
experience that many transition and developing economies have had
with the importation of legal rules from advanced economies: the
rules look good on paper, but because they are not responsive to the
new environment, they are ignored, circumvented, and ultimately rendered ineffective.
In this setting, establishing or maintaining the rule of law depends
on the capacity of the system to adapt effectively to the new circumstances, whether a new technology or a different country. The capacity of the system to adapt effectively depends on legal human capital
and what legal actors know and are able to learn about the "new"
product and the problem of free-riding among retailers. How might
this knowledge and expertise accumulate? In the common-law system, it accumulates largely through litigation. Manufacturers seeking
to enforce their territorial restrictions or avoid antitrust penalties have
an incentive to hire lawyers and legal experts capable of presenting
evidence to the court about the impact of the per se rule on the capacity of manufacturers to sell their product and on their organizational
decisions. They have an incentive to pay their lawyers to develop creative arguments about the use of per se rules as a regulatory technique, to offer alternative interpretations of the governing law, and to
generate alternative rules that a court might adopt. These are investments in case-specific legal human capital which, as we have seen, can
eventually accumulate as shared legal human capital in the system.
Manufacturers will face these incentives assuming that three other
conditions are also met: (1) the cost of these investments-the price
of legal and expert services-does not exceed the damages they face
or the cost of adopting alternatives to territorial restrictions; (2) the
judge they face will be receptive to hearing this evidence and argument; and (3) the investments are expected to pay off because there is
a reasonable likelihood that the judge will understand the evidence
and arguments presented and "get it right."
Conditions (2) and (3) also depend on the level of shared legal
human capital in a legal system. In particular, they depend on the
shared legal human capital available to the judge and the likelihood
that a given judge is able to interpret possibly complex evidence and
arguments accurately. I refer to this as the risk of judicial error, not in
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the narrow sense of "reversible on appeal," but in the more general
sense of diverging from an accurate reading of the facts and failing to
understand that modifying or refining the rule is desirable from society's point of view. Judges are more likely to read facts and understand arguments accurately if they have a broader base of
accumulated legal human capital on which to draw. The greater the
likelihood of judicial error-the smaller the stock of legal human capital on which the judge may draw-the smaller the likelihood that a
judge will be willing to risk departing from the simple, well-articulated, and established per se rule, and thus the smaller the expected
payoff for the manufacturer's investment in presenting evidence and
argument in a given case.
The mechanisms of investment and distribution in legal human capital thus set up an important feedback loop between the incentives of
litigants to expend resources on lawyers (and hence for lawyers to specialize and share their expertise with associates) and the incentives of
judges to adapt the law over time to new and changing circumstances.
Litigants have no incentive to make case-specific investments that ultimately accumulate as shared legal human capital if judges are unwilling to risk novel evidentiary presentations and legal arguments. But
judges may be unwilling to take these risks if these investments have
not, in the past, been made and shared so as to reduce the likelihood
of judicial error. Moreover, litigants have no incentive to make casespecific investments if even those judges willing to make mistakes
make too many of them, 2 9 and these judges never gain access to a
body of legal human capital that may help protect against mistakes.
Thus, the capacity of a legal system to adapt to new or changing
circumstances is both a dynamic and an equilibrium phenomenon.
Clearly, if all judges simply refuse to depart from a strict application
of the per se rule, perhaps because they see it as a violation of their
role as a judge or because they expect that they will be identified as an
"activist" judge and never promoted to a higher court, 30 the law will
not adapt. But even if some judges are willing, in the absence of error,
to entertain evidence and argument about the modification of the
rule, if legal human capital is low, the system as a whole may never
move toward adaptation and reduced legal error because the disincen29. As I will discuss in Part IV, this statement is not exactly correct: it assumes that "litigants"
are all "good" in the sense of the example I am exploring here, that is, manufacturers that wish
to correctly claim that society would be better off if their territorial restrictions were allowed and
enforced.
30. For a discussion of the complex issue of judicial incentives, see Hadfield, Quality of Law,
supra note 10.
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tive of litigants to invest is in equilibrium with the judicial incentive to
play it safe and stick with existing rules. As a result, the rule of law
itself is a dynamic and equilibrium phenomenon, one in which the
work of lawyers and the legal profession plays a central role.
IV.

THE PRICE OF LAW:

COST, ERROR, AND COMPLEXITY

If lawyers play an important role in making the rule of law effective
through the services they provide, the price of lawyers obviously plays
a role too. If lawyers are too expensive, relationships will be designed
and disputes resolved without reference to the law, and legal human
capital never accumulates. This is both a short-term loss to particular
relationships and transactions and a long-term loss to the system and
the rule of law as a whole. For this reason, the cost of legal services
should be a factor in our assessment of the rule of law.
The cost of legal services in advanced market economies, such as
those in the United States, is an increasingly critical reason why some
perceive the rule of law to be waning. Particularly among individuals,
as opposed to businesses, access to lawyers for anything beyond routine legal services (such as drafting wills) is increasingly unavailable.
Implicitly, many relationships are structured and disputes resolved
outside of the law. Some of this extralegal relational work and dispute
resolution is desirable and welcome. For example, when employers
and employees can find mutually satisfying relationships, when divorcing parents can agree amicably on the division of property and the
custody of their children, when businesses can productively and efficiently resolve their payment disputes with their suppliers, when consumers can rely on the discipline of reputation and "no questions
asked" return guarantees for the products they buy, and when those
injured in automobile accidents can quickly collect insurance payments to fully cover their medical expenses and income losses, then
the demand for legal services is low and the rule of law fades in importance as order and fairness are generated by norms, markets, reputations, and goodwill. But when such disputes or relationships are not
resolved in socially desirable ways, but rather in ways that conflict
with the goals that motivate law in the first place-the reduction of
transaction costs, the achievement of efficiency, the redistribution of
power, the protection of children or poorly informed consumers, the
compensation of the injured-then the affordability of legal services is
a sine qua non for an effective rule of law.
This provides a second reason to focus on the accumulation of legal
human capital and the evolution of law as factors in the effective implementation and maintenance of a rule of law in both new and estab-
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lished market democracies. The price of legal services, as determined
by a market for lawyers in a market democracy, increases as legal
human capital accumulates, specialization becomes more extensive,
and law becomes more complex as it adapts. 3' A lawyer who wishes
to perform sophisticated legal analysis has to make costly investments
in education and experience to become competent and thus the returns to legal practice must be high. Indeed, as the increasing specialization of American legal practice attests, sophisticated legal analysis
may require giving up the effort to stay abreast of multiple fields of
law in order to maintain competency as a lawyer in certain markets.
As legal human capital accumulates, a lawyer seeking to analyze the
law in any given setting has to devote increased amounts of time and
research in order to provide competent advice and strategies and compete with other lawyers for those opportunities.
Complexity is also costly because it affects competition in the market for lawyers. 32 First, the more specialized a legal market becomes,
the more likely it is that an individual lawyer or law firm has market
power in the sense that others are not able to offer a substitute performance. For example, in some complex matters, the stakes are so
high and the issues so unique that hiring the one or two lawyers or
firms who have extensive experience in that area is significantly more
valuable than taking the next-best alternative. That lawyer or firm
33
can command a premium.
Second, the more complex the law becomes, the harder it is for clients to assess the quality of the service provided, and for the lawyers
involved to assess whether investing additional time in a case will
make a difference in the outcome. Complex law is a "credence good,"
the quality of which is hard to assess even after the good is "consumed." Markets do not work well in the face of such information
constraints because it is difficult for suppliers to compete on price or
quality and for consumers to direct their purchases accurately on the
basis of a price/quality trade-off. Complexity is costly because it contributes to the failure of competitive markets for legal services. A legal system in which complexity continues to grow is thus one in which
access to legal services becomes constrained and distorted away from

31. See Hadfield, Price of Law, supra note 17.
32. See id. (discussing several reasons).
33. In economics, this is known as monopolistic competition and it exists to varying extents in
markets in which there are unique attributes associated with a good, such as physical location,
brand name, or consumer experience.
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low-dollar matters to high-dollar matters. 34 This creates a constrained
and distorted rule of law.
Complexity and the accumulation of legal human capital may diminish the rule of law not only through their impact on the price of
lawyers, but also through their impact on the predictability of legal
results and the likelihood of legal error. The effect of unpredictability
is relatively well known. Some level of unpredictability may increase
the impact of law on contracting relationships and deterrence 35 and
expand the body of information available to a court that is adapting
rules. 36 But if unpredictability grows too great, the rule of law breaks
down as people and organizations are unwilling to use the law to
structure relationships or disputes and increasingly ignore the law due
to the inability to pattern their activities in a rational way to avoid
penalties or gain benefits. This is a key reason why corruption in a
legal regime is so costly: it not only distorts particular outcomes, it
makes law unreliable and less valuable as a basis for planning conduct
and relationships and resolving disputes.
The effect of complexity and the accumulation of legal human capital on legal error is not as well understood. In Part III, I assumed that
increasing the amount of legal human capital could reduce legal error
because it allows judges to more accurately distinguish between cases
and adapt legal rules to changing and local conditions. Greater legal
human capital in the form of experience with and expertise about vertical territorial restrictions, for example, allows courts to more accurately implement antitrust law in a way that is productively tailored to
the differences between markets in which territorial restraints merely
constrain competition and those in which they overcome an important
market failure. But we can also imagine that the experience and expertise that accumulates as legal human capital may also degrade the
capacity of courts to accurately implement and adapt legal rules. Not
all of the evidence and argument presented to courts in the context of
litigation is designed to increase judicial accuracy; indeed, the goal of
half of those who appear before courts (call them "bad" litigants) is,
knowingly or not, to encourage a court to make a mistake. Whether
bad litigants also contribute to shared legal human capital is an open
34. See Hadfield, Price of Law, supra note 17 (discussing the distortion away from legal matters involving the interests of individuals to those involving the interests of organizations, such as
corporations, wielding aggregate wealth).
35. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORo. 279 (1986); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of
Incomplete Contracts,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of
Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1994).
36. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 610-11 (1992).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:401

question of epistemology-or, as Professor Robert Proctor has
framed it, agnotology (the study of the cultural production of
doubt). 37 Even if distortionary evidence or argument leads a particular court into error, does the legal profession as a whole become better able to distinguish good from bad evidence and argument when it
can look at a collection of cases or other materials that includes those
presented by good and those presented by bad litigants? Can we tell
what is right about an argument only when we have also heard efforts
to employ it incorrectly? Can we decide what it is about a particular
market that merits different treatment under the antitrust laws only
when we have reviewed efforts to analogize that market to ones that
do not merit differential treatment? If so, then accumulating legal
human capital, whatever its provenance, is good from the point of
view of reducing legal error and hence improving the rule of law over
time.
But if bad litigants distort legal decisionmaking, the efforts of individual lawyers to devise legal strategies for clients that exploit legal
errors may increase the rate of those errors over time, undermining
the rule of law. Suppose some manufacturers-who did not actually
face downstream free-rider problems-want to convince courts to relieve them from strict per se application of the antitrust law prohibitions. As they amass more and more expert testimony, legal
argument, and evidence, courts only become more confused about
vertical restraints, free-rider problems, and the market for televisions.
Over time, legal errors in these cases may increase, and error-filled
rules may become more frequent. Even without deliberate efforts to
mislead courts, the sheer accumulation of case-specific evidence and
argument could decrease the capacity of courts to accurately sort the
wheat from the chaff. Thus both the composition (provenance) and
quantum of accumulated legal human capital are potential problems
for the rule of law. One of the reasons to be concerned about the
problems Professor Marc Galanter identified long ago as the imbalances between the "haves" and the "have-nots" 38 is the risk that given
the potential for legal outcomes to be determined by resources and
not reason, over time, the rule of law is undermined by a body of
experience and expertise that gets it wrong.

37.

ROBERT

N.

PROCTOR, CANCER WARS:

How POLITICS SHAPES WHAT WE KNOW AND

DON'T KNOW ABou-r CANCER 8 n.* (1995).

38. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
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CONCLUSION

Lawyers play a critical role in the generation and maintenance of
the rule of law. In part, lawyers communicate legal rules to individuals and organizations and represent their interests in planning and adjudication against the backdrop of legal rules. Even these static and
straightforward roles are sometimes overlooked in legal reform efforts, both in advanced and emerging market democracies. The far
more fundamental role that lawyers play in promoting a rule of law is
found in the dynamic and subtle relationships between what lawyers
do, the legal human capital that accumulates in a legal regime over
time, and the way legal rules adapt to local and changing conditions.
It is an error-one lawyers themselves make-to characterize what
lawyers do solely in terms of their advocacy of particular interests in a
zero-sum setting. Lawyers do work within a strategic setting, and
these strategic concerns must be taken into account in evaluating the
role of lawyers in the rule of law. From an economist's perspective,
however, the problem is not whether lawyers play an important role,
but rather what is their optimal role. What is the optimal level of
complexity in a legal regime in light of both the benefits and the costs
of legal specialization and the accumulation of both good and bad legal human capital? Lawyers become immersed in the complexities of
the interactions of rules, choices, circumstances, goals, perceptions,
and costs. Their professional expertise is the capacity to take those
complexities and relate them to statutes, cases, and legal principles,
and not merely to draft legislation that puts the rule of law on the
books. The complex details of the structure of decentralized decisionmaking in a market economy are the raw materials that inform the
development of a vital and effective rule of law over time, which lives
up to the promise of shaping and channeling private and public behavior in ways that a democratic society deems desirable. The legal profession is a crucial component of that process in both new and
advanced market democracies, and promoting the rule of law in both
settings requires careful attention to the cost, organization, incentives,
norms, and evolution of lawyers' work.
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